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Health care facilities, such as hospitals, nursing homes, and outpatient
health centers, generally maintain detailed medical records for all pa-
tients and residents. These records usually contain physicians' notes re-
garding diagnosis, treatment, and observations, but most often also
contain nurses' and other health care professionals' notes, as well as test
results and other information.
There is no law in the State of Ohio which grants medical records
maintained by health care facilities absolute protection from discovery
pursuant to judicial process. The only legal protection given to such rec-
ords flows either from statutes granting protection to certain types of
records or from the Ohio law of privileged communications, which protects
some communications between patients and certain health care profes-
sionals. Under federal law, the protection given to such records is even
more limited because there is no recognized privilege for communications
made by patients to physicians or other health care professionals.
The law of privileged communications was developed at a time when
health care delivery was markedly different from today's health care
environment. When today's modern health care system is juxtaposed
against the law of privileged communications created during this earlier
time, confusing and inconsistent outcomes have occurred regarding the
discovery and admissibility of medical records maintained by health care
facilities.
Because of the ambiguities which exist under state and federal law, a
health care facility, when faced with a subpoena for medical records, is
placed in the difficult position of determining whether to release the
requested records, to refuse to release any of the records, or to excise
those portions of the records which the health care provider determines
are protected and release the remainder. Failure to respond to the sub-
poena for records exposes the health care facility to contempt of court
charges, while releasing the records may subject the facility to liability
based on a cause of action for breach of confidentiality. Furthermore, the
health care facility may be subject to significant expense due to the time
and potential legal costs involved in determining how to respond to the
subpoena.
This article will review current law in Ohio regarding the protection
of medical records maintained by Ohio health care facilities. The Ohio
law of privileged communications between health care professionals and
patients also will be traced to show how only communications between
patients and their physicians, dentists, psychologists, and social workers
are currently protected. Since similar public policy reasons may apply to
the protection of communications between a wider range of health care
professionals and their patients as those communications with physicians,
dentists, psychologists, and social workers, this article will discuss why the
public policy reasons supporting the initial adoption of the law of privileged
communications are not adequately served by Ohio's limited law.
This article will set forth a course of action to be utilized by health care
facilities to protect their facility and patient records as fully as possible.
This course of action, however, involves significant judicial involvement.
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If followed, it will be an expense for health care facilities and place ad-
ditional burdens on the judicial system. Finally, this article will comment
on how the burden for determining whether records should be released
is unfairly placed upon the health care provider. Suggestions will be given
for legislation to rectify the current problems with Ohio law and for
actions which may be taken by those involved in litigation to reduce
problems with obtaining these records.
I. HOSPITAL RECORDS
A medical record maintained by an inpatient health care facility such
as a hospital or nursing home contains information obtained from a myr-
iad of sources. Central to most inpatient medical records are a physician,
dentist, or podiatrist's notes, diagnosis, orders, and summaries.1 The re-
cord may also contain laboratory and other test results, and entries made
by a wide variety of health care facility personnel, including admitting
staff, nurses, physical therapists, social workers, respiratory care work-
ers, laboratory technicians, and others. The record generally contains
both information transmitted from the patient to the health care worker,
as well as medical determinations made by the health care professional,
treatment rendered to the patient, and advice and information given to
the patient.
In addition to inpatient records, health care facilities maintain records
for outpatient services such as emergency room visits, outpatient surgery,
laboratory tests, and various types of therapy. Contrary to the inpatient
setting, where there will always be diagnostic and treatment information
supplied by the admitting physician, dentist, or podiatrist, the outpatient
record may lack such information except for an initial order for the re-
quested services. Thus, many outpatient records consist exclusively of
lab tests and perhaps nurses' notes.
II. PROTECTION FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS OF PATIENT MEDICAL
INFORMATION MAINTAINED BY HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
A. Limits on Discoverability and Admissibility
of Health Care Information
Health care providers generally have an ethical duty to refrain from
disclosing patient information to third parties. The protection of patients
is the hallmark of the ethical practice of medicine and is recognized as
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.06 (Page's 1988) provides that only a doctor of
medicine, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, or a dentist who is a member of a
hospital medical staff may admit a patient to a hospital while a podiatrist who
is a member of a hospital medical staff may co-admit a patient to a hospital with
a doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathic medicine. Consequently, the notes,
orders, and diagnoses of these individuals provide the basis for a patient's in-
patient care.
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an ethical standard by all major medical, mental health, counseling
organizations2 and health care accreditation organizations.3 These ethical
considerations have been codified in Ohio law as a standard of practice
for many health care professionals. 4 In fact, a professional may be dis-
ciplined by the appropriate licensing agency for betraying a patient's
confidence by disclosing information to a third party.
The sanctions for a health care professional's breach of patient confi-
dentiality are not limited to disciplinary actions before the appropriate
licensing board. A patient who believes that his or her confidentiality
2 See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REVISED PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, (1980); PRINCIPLE IV AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, PRINCIPLE V (1981); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC As-
SOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY
APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY (1981); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS,
CODE OF ETHICS 11 (1979).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.02 (Page's 1988) provides that to operate in the
state, a hospital must be accredited by either the Joint Commission on Accre-
ditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") or the American Osteopathic
Association ("AOA") or be certified to provide hospital services pursuant to Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act ("Medicare"). JCAHO, AOA and Medicare reg-
ulations all require that medical records remain confidential. See JOINT COMMIS-
SION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 1990 ACCREDITATION
MANUAL, Standard-Medical Records 3; THE AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC ASSOCIATION
1989 ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS, Medical Records
Maintenance p. 43; Medicare Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. 482.24 (1988).
JCAHO specifically requires that written patient consent is required for the re-
lease of medical information to persons not otherwise authorized pursuant to law
to obtain such information, and AOA and Medicare regulations provide that
patient information should not be released except in accordance with law, court
orders or subpoenas. These accreditation and certification requirements do not,
however, give a patient a private cause of action for an unauthorized release of
the records by the healthcare providers.
Ohio law regarding the release of medical records by licensed nursing homes
and rest homes, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3721.13 (Page's Supp. 1990), sometimes
referred to as the resident's or patient's bill of rights, grants each nursing home
and rest home patient the right to confidential treatment of personal and medical
records and the right to approve or refuse the release of records to anyone outside
the nursing home except to another home, hospital or health care system, as
required by law or as required by third-party contract. A nursing home or rest
home may lose its license to operate by repeatedly violating the resident's bill of
rights. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.03 (Page's 1990). Any resident who believes
his or her legal right to confidentiality of medical records has been violated may
file a complaint with the Ohio Commission on Aging, and Ohio law specifically
grants a resident of a home a private cause of action for a violation of the resident's
bill of rights. Actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17 (Page's Supp.
1990). Federal regulations also provide that nursing homes protect patient records
from any unauthorized use. 42 C.F.R. 442.318(a)(3).
4 Willfully betraying a professional confidence is an action which by statute
may subject the following licensed professionals to suspension or revocation of
their licenses or similar professional discipline: physicians assistants, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4730.05(I) (Page's 1987); physicians and podiatrists, OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4731.22(B)(4) (Page's Supp. 1990); occupational therapists, OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4755.10(G) (Page's Supp. 1990); and psychologists, OIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4732.17(D) (Page's 1987).
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has been breached by a health care provider, may under some circum-
stances, have a civil cause of action against the health care provider on
a number of legal theories.5 As a practical matter, however, lawsuits
brought by a patient against a health care professional for breach of
confidentiality are rare, in large part because (i) the law does not give
absolute recourse to a patient whose confidentiality has been breached,
and (ii) a patient considering bringing suit may determine that a lawsuit
would only further disclose to the public sensitive information which the
patient wishes to remain confidential.
I Case law in Ohio has held that health care providers have a common law
fiduciary duty to protect the confidentiality of patient information, and conse-
quently, that a breach of contract action may be sustained for a breach of such
duty. See Hammonds v. Aetna, 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio); motion denied, 243
F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). In Hammonds, the court determined that a common
law fiduciary duty not to divulge professional confidences arises in Ohio between
physicians and their patient because Ohio law recognizes a physician-patient
privilege preventing a physician from testifying in court regarding confidential
communications made by the patient to the physician, and because a physician
may be disciplined by the State Medical Board for divulging a professional con-
fidence. Given the reasoning of the court, presumably the fiduciary duty to keep
information confidential exists for any health care provider who both is covered
by the testimonial privilege not to divulge confidential communications and is
subject to disciplinary action for breach of a professional confidence. Theref- re,
physicians, podiatrists, psychologists, counselors, and social workers, all of whom
are subject to a testimonial privilege and may be disciplined for willfully betraying
a professional confidence, arguably have a fiduciary duty to keep patient infor-
mation confidential and may be liable to the patient for a breach of such duty.
While the Hammonds court pointed out that many states recognize a common
law fiduciary duty not to disclose confidential information applicable to any health
professional to whom the testimonial privilege applies, and other states recognize
the duty for those professionals who may be disciplined for breach of a confidence,
the court in Hammonds did not conclude that a common law fiduciary duty to
keep patient information confidential exists for professionals. For example, phy-
sician's assistants, who, while they may be disciplined for willfully betraying a
professional confidence, are not covered by the law of privileged communications.
A patient may have a cause of action against a nursing home for breach of
confidentiality required by the patient bill of rights. See infra note 12 and ac-
companying text.
A patient whose confidentiality is breached may also have a cause of action
for breach of privacy. The right of privacy is the right of a person to be free from
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, or the publicizing
of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such a manner as to cause
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Housh v. Peth, 165
Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). Ohio courts have held that a patient's privacy
may be invaded by the release of confidential medical information to parties
having no need to know such information, such as when a hospital released
information regarding a patient's alcoholism treatment to the employer of the
patient's husband. (Prince v. St. Frances - St. George Hospital, Inc., 20 Ohio App.
3d 4, 484 N.E.2d 265 (Hamilton Cty. 1985)), and when an employer's in-house
medical claims examiner released information about one employee to another
employee (Levias v. United Airlines, 27 Ohio App. 3d 222, 500 N.E.2d 370 (Cuy-
ahoga Cty., 1985)).
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While there is a general duty imposed upon health care facilities to
keep patient information confidential, the law requires full disclosure of
all relevant information in litigation, unless special protection is granted
by law to protect information from disclosure.6 Despite the general re-
quirement that information be released as part of the judicial process,
two significant types of protection exist to protect certain medical records.
First, specific protection is given to records regarding special types of
treatment or illnesses such as drug abuse, alcoholism, and mental health
treatment and information regarding testing persons for human immu-
nodeficiency virus ("HIV"), diagnosed or treated for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") or an AIDS related condition ("ARC"). Sec-
ond, protection also is given to the information constituting the privileged
communication between the patient and the health care professional(s).
B. Statutes Protecting Certain Records from Judicial Disclosure
1. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Records
The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treat-
ment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, and the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act of 19727 ("Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts"), provide that
any drug abuse or alcoholism treatment program that either directly or
indirectly receives federal funds must keep patient records and infor-
mation strictly confidential, and may only release such records pursuant
to judicial process in limited circumstances. 8
The Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts apply only to information and records
maintained by distinct drug abuse and alcoholism treatment programs.
For a treatment program of a general medical facility, such as a hospital,
to be covered by the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts, the facility must have
an identified unit which provides alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treat-
ment or referral, or medical personnel whose primary function is the
provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment or referral. 9 Treat-
ing patients for alcohol or drug related conditions as part of the hospital's
general medical services is not sufficient to bring the records under the
protection of these Acts. Furthermore, in order for a program to qualify
6 See Ex parte Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 798 (1951). OHIo R. Civ. P.
26(B) states: "parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... in-
cluding the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location, of any
books, documents, or other tangible things .... " See Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1 (1954).
1 Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention; Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. 290 dd-3 (1982), the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. 1175 (1981) 42 C.F.R. 290ee-3 (implemented
by The Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act).
8Id.
9 42 C.F.R. 2.11 (1987).
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for legislative protection, it must receive direct or indirect government
support. Direct or indirect support exists, for example, in the case of a
program (or a larger facility of which the program is a part) which qual-
ifies for medicare reimbursement for its services or is part of a non-profit
organization which is exempt from federal income tax.10
The confidentiality requirements of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts
are extremely broad. For example, they provide that records regarding
the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient connected
with any covered drug or alcohol abuse program may be disclosed only
upon the specific written authorization of the patient," or under limited
circumstances 12 such as an appropriate court order following a show cause
hearing. 13 A fine of $500 is imposed upon a program for the first incident
of improper disclosure of patient information, and a $5,000 fine for each
subsequent offense.' 4
10 42 C.F.R. 2.12(b) (1987).
11 For a patient's consent to be effective, the consent form must contain the
following information: (1) the name of the program that is to make the disclosure;
(2) the name or title of the person or organization to which disclosure is to be
made; (3) the name of the patient; (4) the purpose or need for disclosure; (5) the
extent or nature of information to be disclosed; (6) a statement that the consent
is subject to revocation at any time except to the extent that action has been
taken in reliance thereon, and a specification of the date, event, or condition upon
which it will expire without express revocation; (7) the date on which the consent
is signed; and (8) the signature of the patient. 42 C.F.R. 2.31(a) (1987).
12 Patient information may be released in the following circumstances: (1) to
medical personnel to the extent necessary to meet a bona fide medical emergency;
(2) to qualified research personnel, providing that the patient's identity remains
anonymous; (3) upon an appropriate court order following a show cause hearing;
(4) to make reports of child abuse consistent with state law, (although such in-
formation may not be used in any subsequent civil or criminal action arising out
of the subject of the report); (5) to law enforcement agencies if crimes are com-
mitted or threatened by a patient or former patient against personnel of the drug
abuse or alcoholism program itself; (6) records maintained by programs run by
the Veterans Administration; and (7) certain records maintained by the Armed
Forces. 42 C.F.R. 2.51-2.67.
13 42 C.F.R. 2.63 (1987) provides that a court order may be granted to release
information only in the following circumstances:
Confidential communications.
(a) A court order under these regulations may authorize disclosure
of confidential communications made by a patient to a program in the
course of diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment only if:
(1) The disclosure is necessary to protect against an existing
threat to life or of serious bodily injury, including circumstances
which constitute suspected child abuse and neglect and verbal
threats against third parties;
(2) The disclosure is necessary in connection with investigation
or prosecution of an extremely serious crime, such as one which
directly threatens loss of life or serious bodily injury, including
homicide, rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon, or child abuse and neglect; or
(3) The disclosure is in connection with litigation or an ad-
ministrative proceeding in which the patient offers testimony or
other evidence pertaining to the content of the confidential com-
munications.
'442 C.F.R. 2.5 (1987).
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A program subject to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts confronts a
serious dilemma when it receives a subpoena for a patient's records. The
federal law requires that a provider not even acknowledge a patient's
presence in the program. Therefore, should the provider tell a requesting
party or the court that it cannot legally release the records, the provider
will, in essence, have acknowledged that the patient, was treated by the
program. Consequently, the provider may be in violation of the federal
law. In responding to a subpoena, the provider must, therefore, remain
non-committal and inform the party issuing the subpoena that if the
facility has any records, such records will be released after a proper show
cause hearing has been held addressing whether or not the facility has
records responsive to the subpoena.
To accomplish such a response to the subpoena, the facility should send
a form letter to the court stating that the facility is not legally permitted
to acknowledge the existence of any records pertaining to a specific person
and requesting that the subpoena be withdrawn. If the subpoena is not
withdrawn, the facility must respond to the subpoena either by filing a
motion to quash the subpoena or by having a representative appear in
court at the designated time and place and refuse to respond to questions
or to turn over documents. However, if the court holds a show cause
hearing in accordance with the law and the judge orders the documents
to be released, the facility may then release the records without fear of
improper disclosure.
2. Mental Health Records
Section 5122.31 of the Ohio Code15 provides that all records made in
conjunction with the treatment and hospitalization of mentally ill pa-
tients be kept confidential and not be disclosed except pursuant to a court
order and certain other limited circumstances.16 Therefore, unless another
15 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31 (Page's 1990).
16 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31 (Page's 1990) provides that mental health
records may also be released in the following circumstances:
1. The patient or legal guardian or parent consents and the disclosure
is in the best interest of the patient;
2. Disclosures to the Department of Mental Health for purposes of
complying with OHIO REV. CODE § 5122 or OHIO REV. CODE
§ 5123.60;
3. Disclosures of necessary medical information to insurers to obtain
payment for goods and services furnished to the patient, if properly
authorized;
4. Disclosures to the patient made pursuant to the patient's request,
unless specifically restricted in the patient's treatment plan for
clear treatment reasons; or
5. Disclosures made by hospitals and other institutions and facilities
within the Department of Mental Health to other hospitals, insti-
tutions, and facilities and with mental health clinical facilities with
which the Department has a current agreement for patient care
or services.
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statutory exception applies, such as receiving appropriate patient consent,
a facility should not release a patient's mental health records unless a
judge has issued a court order for the specific records.
Section 5122.31 of the Ohio Revised Code, which governs mental health
records, arguably conflicts with the law regarding privileged communi-
cations. Under the law of privileged communication, as discussed in Sec-
tion C below, certain information maintained by physicians, dentists,
podiatrists, psychologists, and social workers is not subject to discovery.
Such information includes mental health records, as well as other records.
However, Section 5122.31 implies that such information may be released
pursuant to a court order and does not delineate the standards to be used
by the judge in determining whether to grant the order. 17 If a judge, when
determining whether to issue a court order, applies the law of privileged
communications, the judge will only authorize release of non-privileged
information and there will not be any conflict between the two statutes.
The mental health statute, however, does not affirmatively compel the
judge to consider the law of privileged communications. Therefore, if the
judge, when considering whether to grant a court order pursuant to Sec-
tion 5122.31, does not accept that the law of privileged communications
applies, the mental health confidentiality statute, which was intended to
give added protection to mental health records, may actually eliminate
the statutory protection generally given to privileged communications.
3. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Records
Ohio law requires that the manner in which HIV tests are performed
and test results be kept confidential, as well as the identity of persons
diagnosed with AIDS or ARC.' 8 Except in limited circumstances, no
health care worker or health care provider may reveal to any third party,
including another health care worker in the same facility, that a person
was tested for HIV, the results of that test, or the identity of any person
diagnosed with AIDS or ARC.' 9 The limited statutory exceptions provide
for the release of this information in a civil proceeding when the plaintiff
in the case has alleged that he or she contracted HIV from the defendant
6. On notice to the patient and in the absence of the patient's objection,
to a patient's family member involved in planning for or providing
services to the patient;
7. Exchanged by community mental health agencies and the mental
health board to provide services to a person who is committed
pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 5722.15;
8. To the executor of a deceased patient's estate if the records are
necessary to administer the estate; or
9. Upon the request of a prosecutor when the patient is committed
pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE Chapter 2945.
See also HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW Banks Baldwin.
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31(D) (Page's Supp. 1990).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243 (Page's Supp. 1990).
19 Id.
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and in criminal proceedings. Furthermore, a court ordered release of the
HIV test of a particular person in any judicial proceeding may be required
after an in camera review of a motion filed by a party asserting that the
information is necessary for the proceeding. 20 In the event that infor-
mation regarding a patient is improperly disclosed to a third party, Ohio
law provides that the patient shall have a civil action against the dis-
closing party, in which the patient may be awarded compensatory dam-
ages and attorney's fees.2 However, a facility which is sued by a patient
for the acts of its personnel for improperly releasing such information
may not be held liable "unless the person [staff personnel] knew or should
have known of the violation. 22
Similar to mental health records, information regarding a person's HIV
test or diagnosis of AIDS or ARC may also fall under the definition of
privileged communications. While Ohio's AIDS law authorizes release of
information regarding HIV, AIDS, or ARC in criminal proceedings and
in certain civil proceedings, the law of privileged communications might
preclude such release. To permit the release of such information pursuant
to Ohio's AIDS law would be to take away protection otherwise given to
privileged patient communications. It is likely, therefore, that the pro-
tection given AIDS information will be construed as being extra protec-
tion which is overlayed on the protection ordinarily afforded privileged
communications. Therefore, the exceptions to confidentiality provided for
in the AIDS law are most likely only applicable when dealing with in-
formation generally not regarded as privileged.
4. Application of the Special Protection Statutes
The protection given patient records pursuant to the Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Acts flows from federal statutory law, and consequently, should be
effective in criminal and civil actions in both federal and state court
proceedings. Information protected by the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts
should therefore only be released after an appropriate show cause hearing
and court order, regardless of the forum.
The laws which protect records regarding mental health treatment,
HIV, AIDS, and ARC are state-mandated restrictions. It is questionable,
therefore, whether these laws will prohibit the release of patient medical
records in federal court proceedings. 23 If the statutes which provide special
protection to mental health records, HIV test results, or records of persons
20 A court may not compel a blood bank, hospital blood center, or blood collection
facility to disclose the results of HIV tests in a manner that reveals the identity
of voluntary blood donors except in criminal proceedings. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.243(B) (Page's Supp. 1990).
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.244(B) (Page's Supp. 1990).
22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.244(E) (Page's Supp. 1990).
23 See Section II, A.
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diagnosed with AIDS or ARC are not held to apply in federal court, a
health care facility may be left to rely solely upon the general federal
principals of privileged communications regarding these types of medical
records .
24
C. Ohio Privileges for Communications with
Health Care Professionals
Rule 501 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence provides that:
[t]he privilege of a witness, person, state or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by statute enacted by the General
Assembly or by principles of common law as interpreted by the
courts of this state in light of reason and experience. 2
Rule 101 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence 26 provides that the rule regarding
privileges applies to all proceedings in the Ohio courts, proceedings before
court-appointed referees and magistrates, as well as to all stages of ac-
tions, cases, and proceedings conducted pursuant to the Ohio Rules of
Evidence.2 7 Similarly, Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 26(B) provides that
parties discover information regarding any matter that is not privileged
but which is relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.2
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, from which Ohio Rule of Evidence 501
is patterned provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the priv-
ilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political sub-
division thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state,
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accord-
ance with state law.29
u See Section II, D.
2 OHIO R. EVID. 501.
2 OHIO R. EVID. 101.
2 OHIO R. Evm. 101. While Rule 101(C) provides an exception to application
of the Rules of Evidence to certain proceedings, including grand juries, miscel-
laneous criminal proceedings such as probation hearings, issuance of warrants,
sentencing, and contempt proceedings, this rule specifically provides that these
exceptions do not apply to the application of the law regarding privileges. There-
fore, laws regarding privileges apply to all judicial proceedings in Ohio.
2 Omio R. CIv. P. 26(B).
FED. R. EVID. 501.
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This means that in federal civil cases based upon state claims, predom-
inantly diversity cases and certain actions such as those brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act,30 the state law of privileges applies. In
federal criminal cases and federal civil cases based upon federal claims,
however, a court will only apply the federal law of privileges, which is
extremely limited, as discussed in Section II, D below.
Similar to Ohio Evidence Rule 101(B), Federal Rule of Evidence 11011
provides that the rule regarding privileges applies to all actions and
proceedings in federal court. The laws of privileges, whether state or
federal, therefore apply to every aspect ofjudicial process in both criminal
and civil cases, including discovery and pretrial actions.
The laws of privileges are evidentiary rules and only determine when
persons may not be compelled to testify or otherwise release information
in a judicial proceeding. As a result, these laws do not apply outside the
judicial process. 32
There is no privilege at common law for communications made by
patients to a health care provider. Rather, this area is entirely a creature
of statute. 33 Ohio adopted its first statutory version of the physician-
patient privilege in 1880,34 and today that law is codified as a statutory
privilege against disclosure of conversations between patients and phy-
sicians, 5 dentists,36 or podiatrists,3 7 and between clients and psycholo-
gists,38 professional counselors, counselor assistants, social workers, social
worker assistants, or independent social workers3 9 ("Health Care Profes-
sional-Patient Privileges").
30 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1990); see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
31 FED. R. EviD. 1101.
12 Some quasi-judicial proceedings may adopt some or all of the Rules of Evi-
dence or principles underlying such rules, and consequently, may adopt the law
of privileged communications. See also State Medical Board v. Miller, 44 Ohio
St.3d 136, 541 N.E.2d 602 (1989) (which provides when the physician-patient
privilege is applicable in state Medical Board proceedings.). See, e.g., Ohio Motor
Vehicle Dealers Bd. v. Remlinger, 8 Ohio St.3d 26, 457 N.E.2d 309 (1983); Ches-
apeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. PUCO, 163 Ohio St. 252, 126 N.E.2d 314(1955) (holding
that administrative agencies may not act in complete disregard for the essential
rules of evidence or the rights of the parties, and the law of privileges are generally
applicable in administrative proceedings.)
See generally Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confiden-
tiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 KY. L. J. 473
(1986-87); DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient,
10 W. REs. L. REV. 488, 491-92 (1959).
' OHIO REV. STAT. 5241(1) (1880).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Page's Supp. 1990).
36 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Page's Supp. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02(B)(4) (Page's Supp. 1990). Dentists were not covered by the phy-
sician patient privilege, and were added to § 2317.02(B)(4) with the passage of
S.B. 2 effective November 1, 1989. See Belichick v. Belichick, 37 Ohio App.2d 95,
307 N.E.2d 270 (1973).
37 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02(B)(1), 2371.02(B)(4) (Page's Supp. 1990).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19 (Page's 1987).
39 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G) (Page's Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 5:2
THE DISCOVERY OF MEDICAL RECORDS
The privilege granted communications between patients and physi-
cians, dentists, podiatrists and psychologists is codified in Section 2317.02
of the Ohio Code, 40 which provides that the above-referenced persons shall
not testify in certain respects:
(B)(1) A physician [including a podiatrist] or a dentist con-
cerning a communication made to him by his patient in that
relation of his advice to his patient .... The testimonial priv-
ilege under this division is waived, and a physician or dentist
may testify or may be compelled to testify in a civil action...
under the following circumstances:
(a) If the patient or the guardian or other legal representative
of the patient gives express consent;
(b) If the patient is deceased, the spouse of the patient or his
executor or administrator gives express consent; and
(c) If a medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or op-
tometric claim, as defined in section 2305.11 of the Revised
Code, an action for wrongful death, any other type of civil
action, or a claim under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code
is filed by the patient, the personal representative of the
estate of the patient if deceased, or his guardian or other
legal representative.
(2) If the testimonial privilege described in division (B)(1) of
this section is waived as provided in division (B)(1)(c) of
this section, a physician or dentist may be compelled to
testify or to submit to discovery under the Rules of Civil
Procedure only as to a communication made to him by the
patient in question in that relation, or his advice to the
patient in question, that related causally or historically to
physical or mental injuries that are relevant to issues in
the medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or op-
tometric claim, action for wrongful death, other civil action,
or claim under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code.
41
Section 4732.19 of the Ohio Code42 specifically grants communications
made to psychologists the same privilege as that extended to physicians,
dentists and podiatrists pursuant to Section 2317.02(B).
The counselor and social worker privilege is codified at Section
2317.02(G) of the Ohio Code. 43 That privilege provides that the following
persons may not testify in the following instances:
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page's Supp. 1990).
41 Id.
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19 (Page's Supp. 1990).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G) (Page's Supp. 1990).
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A school guidance counselor who holds a valid teacher's cer-
tificate from the state board of education as provided for in
section 3319.22 of the Revised Code or a person licensed or
registered under Chapter 4757 of the Revised Code and the
rules adopted under it as a professional counselor, counselor
assistant, social worker, social work assistant, or independent
social worker concerning a confidential communication made
to him by his client in that relation or his advice to his client
unless any of the following apply:
1. The communication or advice indicates clear and present
danger to the client or other persons. For the purposes of
this division, cases in which there are indications of pres-
ent or past child abuse or neglect of the client constitute
a clear and present danger;
2. The client gives express consent to the testimony;
3. If the client is deceased, the surviving spouse or the ex-
ecutor or administrator of the estate of the deceased client
gives express consent;
4. The client voluntarily testifies, in which case the school
guidance counselor or person licensed or registered under
Chapter 4757 of the Revised Code and the rules adopted
under it may be compelled to testify on the same subject;
5. The court, pursuant to an in camera inspection, deter-
mines that the information communicated by the client
is not germane to the counselor-client or social worker-
client relationship; and
6. A court, in an action brought against a school, its admin-
istration, or any of its personnel by the client, rules after
an in camera inspection that the testimony of the school
guidance counselor is relevant to that action.4 4
The Ohio Tort Reform Act of 1987,45 effective January 5, 1988, made
significant changes to the law of privileged communications made to
health care providers. In effect, these changes greatly expanded waivers
of the privilege by a party filing a civil action. The 1987 Act applies only
to records sought in actions commenced on or after January 5, 1988, which
are based upon tortious conduct which has occurred after January 5,
1988.46 Therefore, if the records of a health care provider are sought for
- Id.
41 Ohio Tort Reform Act of 1987, 142 v H1 (effective 1-5-88).
-' Id. at § 3(A). This provision reads as follows:
The provisions of the amendments to sections 1775.14, 2125.02,
2307.31, 2307.32, 2307.60, 2309.01, 2315.18, 2315.19, 2317.02,
2323.51, 4507.07, and 4513.263 of the Revised Code made in this act
and the provisions of sections 2307.33, 2315.21, 2317.45, 2317.62,
2323.56, and 4705.15 of the Revised Code as enacted by this act shall
apply only to tort or other civil actions that are commenced on or after
the effective date of this act and that are based upon claims for relief
that arise on or after that date, and only to tortious conduct that
occurs on or after that date. Section 3(A).
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actions filed prior to January 5, 1988 or for actions filed after that date,
but based upon conduct which occurred prior to that date, the law which
was in effect prior to the enactment of the Tort Reform Act of 1987 is
operative.4 7
47 The law regarding physician, podiatrist and psychologist-patient privileges
prior to the Tort Reform Act provided:
2317.02. Privileged communications and acts.
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(A) An attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his
client in that relation or his advice to his client, except that the
attorney may testify by express consent of the client or, if the client
is deceased, by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the
executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased client and
except that, if the client voluntarily testifies or is deemed by section
2151.421 of the Revised Code to have waived any testimonial privilege
under this division, the attorney may be compelled to testify on the
same subject:
(B)(1) A physician concerning a communication made to him by
his patient in that relation of his advice to his patient, except as
otherwise provided in this division and division (B)(2) of this section,
and except that, if the patient is deemed by section 2151.421 of the
Revised Code to have waived any testimonial privilege under this
division, the physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.
The testimonial privilege under this division is waived, and a phy-
sician may testify or may be compelled to testify in a civil action, in
accordance with the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in connection with a civil action, or if connection with a claim
under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code, under the following circum-
stances:
(a) If the patient or the guardian or other legal representative of
the patient gives express consent;
(b) If the patient is deceased, the spouse of the patient or his ex-
ecutor or administrator gives express consent;
(c) If a medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or opto-
metric claim, as defined in Section 2305.11 of the Revised Code, an
action for wrongful death, any other type of civil action, or a claim
under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code is filed by the patient, the
personal representative of the patient if deceased or of his estate, or
his guardian or other legal representative.
(2) If the testimonial privilege described in division (B)(1) of this
section is waived as provided in divisions (B)(1)(c) of this section, a
physician may be compelled to testify or to submit to discovery under
the Rules of Civil Procedure only as to a communication made to him
by the patient in question in that relation, or his advice to the patient
in question, that related causally or historically to physical or mental
injuries that are relevant to issues in the medical claim, dental claim,
chiropractic claim, or optometric claim, action for wrongful death,
other civil action, or claim under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code.
(3) As used in divisions (B)(1) and (2) of this section, "communi-
cation" means acquiring, recording, or transmitting any information,
in any manner, concerning any facts, opinions, or statements neces-
sary to enable a physician to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a
patient. A "communication" may include, but is not limited to, any
medical, office, or hospital communication such as a record, chart,
letter, memorandum, laboratory test and results, x-ray, photograph,
financial statement, diagnosis, or prognosis.
(4) Divisions (B)(1), (2), and (3) of this section apply to doctors of
medicine, doctors of osteopathic medicine, and doctors or podiatric
medicine.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page's 1981).
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In order for information to be protected from judicial process by any of
the Health Care Professional-Patient Privileges, the following three ele-
ments must be present: (1) there must be a patient or client; (2) a qual-
ifying communication must be made; and (3) the communication must be
made to or received by the health care professional who is recognized by
statute as covered by the privilege.
1. Patients and Clients for Purposes of
Privileged Communications
In order for a person to qualify as a patient or a client for purposes of
any of the Health Care Professional-Patient Privileges, a person must
intend or desire to become a patient 4 and receive diagnostic services for
treatment. Therefore, courts have held that a person does not become a
"patient" by being a blood donor because such donor is not seeking medical
services but is merely having blood drawn to donate. 49 Similarly, neither
does a person who receives treatment involuntarily, pursuant to a court
order, nor a person who fraudulently communicates information to a
health care professional,50 possess the requisite intent or desire to be a
patient of that specific health care professional since that health care
professional-patient relationship is based upon fraudulent statements.
2. Privileged Communications
a. What Constitutes a Communication
A communication for purposes of the physician, podiatrist, dentist and
psychologist privileges is defined as acquiring, recording, or transmitting
any information, in any manner, concerning any facts, opinions, or state-
ments necessary to enable that health care professional to diagnose, treat,
prescribe, or act for a patient.51 Communication further includes "any
medical, office, or hospital communication such as a record, chart, letter,
memorandum, laboratory test and result, x-ray, photograph, financial
statement, diagnosis or prognosis" created to reflect the relationship be-
tween a patient and the statutorily recognized health care professional
and includes any advice of any such health care professional to the patient
or client as part of the health care relationship.5 2 While there was no
48 One of the crucial policy reasons for the privileges is the promotion of free
and full discourse between the patient or client and his or her health care profes-
sional. This reason is not present with an involuntary patient. See Doe v. Univ.
of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (Franklin Cty. 1988).
49 Id.
50 See State ex rel Buckman v. Stokes, 36 Ohio App. 3d 109, 521 N.E.2d 515
(Hamilton 1989); Whipple v. Render, No. 2480 (9th Dist. Ct. App.) (Ohio 1989).
51 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Page's Supp. 1990).
52 Id. While the statutory language lists laboratory tests and results as com-
munications, tests and results generally are only communications if they are used
by the health care professional to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the patient
or client. Therefore, a test performed on donated blood which is not for diagnosis
or treatment of the donor but for the benefit of the recipient of the blood does not
constitute a communication for statutory privileges. Univ. of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio
App. 3d at 528, N.E.2d at 419. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G) (Page's Supp.
1990).
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statutory definition of "communication" prior to the Tort Reform Act of
1987, case law had interpreted communications to include physical ex-
aminations of the body and laboratory tests, as well as oral communi-
cations.
53
The term "communication" for purposes of the counselor and social
worker-client privilege is not defined by law. The privilege attachs to a
"confidential communication" made by a client to his or her counselor or
social worker and advice given to the client by the counselor or social
worker. 5
4
Records which merely establish the existence of a health care profes-
sional-patient relationship or evidence the fact that a patient was treated
are not "communications" within the health care professional relationship
and are not privileged.55 Therefore, absent special protection such as that
granted by the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Acts, a health care facility may
be required to disclose the names of patients and the dates they have
been treated.
b. The Presence of Third Parties
A traditional interpretation of the law of privileges suggests that if
third parties are present during the communication, then the parties did
not intend for the communications to be confidential, and thus, the priv-
ilege does not apply.56 This issue was addressed in Urseth v. City of
Dayton,57 where the court stated in dicta that:
- See Baker v. Industrial Commission, 139 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 529 (1939)
(holding the exhibition of the 'body to a physician is covered by the privilege);
State v. Dress, 10 Ohio App. 3d 258, 461 N.E.2d 1312 (Lucas Cty. 1982), and
Kromenacker v. Bystone, 43 Ohio App. 3d 126, 539 N.E.2d 675 (Lucas Cty. 1987)
(holding laboratory test is communications).
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G) (Page's Supp. 1990). Note that the coun-
selor and social worker-client privilege limits the privilege to "confidential" com-
munications, while the physician, podiatrist, dentist and psychologist privilege
does not employ the word "confidential." This appears to be a meaningless dif-
ference, however, since historically all privileges apply only to confidential com-
munications, and the Ohio courts generally have held that communications made
to a physician by his patient or to the patient by the physician are only privileged
if they were intended to be confidential. Therefore, prescriptions written by a
physician but intended to be read by a pharmacist are not confidential commu-
nications and are not covered by the privilege. State v. Treadway, 328 N.E.2d
825 (Ohio App. 1974), and since a death certificate is a public record intended to
be public, a physician's statements on such death certificate are not privileged,
Perry v. Indus. Comm., 160 Ohio St. 520, 117 N.E.2d 34 (1954).
m See Willig v. Prudential Ins. Co., 71 Ohio App. 255, 49 N.E.2d 421 (Hamilton
Cty. 1942); Grant Hosp. v. Nichols, 27 Ohio App. 2d 166,273 N.E.2d 144 (Franklin
Cty. 1971).
56 See Note, Evidence-Priviliged Communications in Divorce Actions: Psychi-
atrist-Patient and Presence of Third Parties. 40 TENN L.REv. 110 (1972).
11 653 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
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For example, the physician-patient privilege of Section
2317.02(B) has been construed as not extending to medical or
hospital records, unless said records contain, in whole or in
part, communications between the plaintiff and physician, not
in the presence of third parties, regarding diagnosis and treat-
ment.
58
Thus, if a nurse or family member were present during the interaction
between the physician and patient, then the communication would no
longer be deemed privileged. Most probably, the average patient believes
that any communication made to or received from the physician pursuant
to a physician/patient relationship is confidential, even if it is made in
the presence of a nurse or a companion of the patient. If the patient were
asked why the privilege would apply in this case, the patient would
probably state that the nurse is under the supervision of the physician,
and therefore, is required to keep confidential all conversations between
the physician and patient witnessed either from being present or from
access to all the contents of the medical record. In addition, the patient
probably does not realize that information conveyed to a physician in the
presence of the patient's spouse may cause the information to lose its
privilege. Thus, under a traditional view, all patients and health care
professionals should be aware that communications between health care
professionals and their patients, in the presence of any third parties, are
not privileged.
This narrow interpretation of confidential communications may render
the Health Care Professional-Patient Privilege entirely non-existent
when dealing with certain health care specialties. For instance, many
obstetricians and gynecologists ("OB-GYN") routinely have a nurse pres-
ent during all examinations. The OB-GYN specialty is one in which there
may be significant sensitive information which may be imperative for the
patient to communicate to her physician such as information regarding
AIDS or drug and alcohol abuse. To defeat the privilege by the mere
existence of a nurse, who is after all also a health care professional, could
have a chilling effect on open communications. For example, if patients
become aware that such communications are not kept confidential, they
may fail to disclose necessary and vital information to their health care
practitioner.
While communications not intended to be confidential or those made
in the presence of third parties are not protected by the Health Care
Professional Privileges, courts have held that if a communication is other-
wise a privileged communication, and the communication is transcribed
into a patient's chart where third parties have access to the information,
the information still maintains its status as privileged information. 59
Id. at 1066 n. 4 (emphasis added).
See Humphrey v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 22 Ohio St. 3d 94, 488 N.E.2d
877 (1986); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 42 N.E.2d 245 (1947); State v.
McKinnon, 38 Ohio App. 3d 28, 525 N.E.2d 821 (Summit Cty. 1987).
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Presumably, this would also be the result if the physician or other health
care professional protected by the privilege disclosed the information to
nurses or other health care workers. This is logically consistent because
it is the patient's intent to have the communication remain confidential
which must determine whether the privilege attachs. Accordingly, the
result should not be governed by what a third party, who is out of the
control of the patient, does with the information.
3. Qualifying Providers for Purposes of
Privileged Communications
Historically, the Ohio statutes addressing privileged relationships have
been interpreted very narrowly granting protection to only those profes-
sionals specifically named in the statute. The courts have held that in-
formation given to non-physician health care providers, such as nurses
and laboratory technicians, is not privileged, since these individuals are
functioning as independent health care workers.6 0 The leading case in
this area, Weis v. Weis,61 held that a nurse did not qualify for the physician-
patient privilege because if the legislature had intended nurses and pa-
tients communications to be confidential, such protection would have been
explicitly granted by the statute. Similarly, in State v. McKinnon, 2 the
court allowed a medical technologist to testify about a patient's test, even
when the technician was carrying out the orders of a physician:
Nor can the test results be deemed protected on an agency
theory, where the physician directed the medical technologist
to run the test. That argument was specifically rejected in Weis,
where the communications in dispute were made to nurses,
who were employed by the hospital and worked under the di-
rection of the attending physician. Communications made to a
nurse in the performance of her duties are not privileged unless
the nurse is also a physician or surgeon.6 3
In an acute care setting, the majority of a patient's medical record will
contain entries made by persons to whom communications are not sta-
tutorily protected. Therefore, following Weis, the majority of the medical
records are discoverable when the individuals are not being treated for
alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, or AIDS. It is inconsistent to
protect small portions of a record when the discoverable portions most
probably address the same topics. It must be questioned whether this is
what the legislature intended when adopting the Health Care Profes-
sional-Privileges.
61 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947); McKinnon, 38 Ohio
App. 3d at 28, 525 N.E.2d at 821; Willis v. The Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
28 Ohio App. 497, 162 N.E. 822 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1928).
61 147 Ohio St. at 416, 72 N.E.2d at 245.
12 38 Ohio App. 3d at 28, 525 N.E.2d at 821.
a Id.
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For example, if a patient enters the hospital for treatment on one matter
and the physician diagnoses the patient as also having venereal disease,
the physician would not be allowed to testify in court about this disease
unless the patient waived the privilege. A nurse, however, who discussed
the issue with the patient and was present during the physician's visits
to the patient would not be able to claim a privilege and could be called
to testify. It may be questioned, then, why there should be statutory
protection for communications between a physician and a patient, when
a nurse is allowed legally to testify on any matter witnessed by the nurse.
As this example illustrates, the narrow interpretation of the health care
professional-patient privilege has not kept pace with modern health care
facilities, procedures, and practices due to the proliferation of separately
licensed and functioning health care workers.
In a very recent case, an Ohio Appellate Court in Johnston v. Miami
Valley Hospital apparently adopted this reasoning by holding that a hos-
pital's records which consist of nurse's notes are within the statutory
definition of a protected communication pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
§ 23217.02(B)(3).6 The court stated that
"R.C. 2317.02(B)(3) defines 'communication' broadly to cover
the acquisition by the physician of any facts, opinions or state-
ments found in a hospital record necessary to enable a physi-
cian to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a patient. This
would clearly cover notations made by a nurse in the "nurses
notes" portions of a hospital record.... ,65
It is our reading of the present statute that such notes are privileged
under the statute as they are included within the statutory definition of
"communication." This court did not challenge the Ohio Supreme Court's
reading of Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02(B)(3) in the Weis decision that nurses
are not granted a privilege but instead brought certain nurses notes under
the statutory definition of "communication." The Weis court, however,
specifically stated that for the statute to grant protection to nurses' notes,
the Ohio General Assembly must take steps to amend the statute. Due
to the inconsistent effect that the Weis and Johnston case have in inter-
preting the application of the law of privileges to nurses notes, it is unclear
how courts in the future will apply Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02. If the
Johnston case is appealed, the Ohio Supreme Court will have the oppor-
tunity to reexamine the Weis case in light of the present day health care
system.
4. Waiver of and Exceptions to Privileged Communications
a. Consent. The privilege for communications between a patient and a
physician, podiatrist, dentist and psychologist provides that the patient,
patient's guardian, or a legal representative of the patient may expressly
waive the privilege. 6 While there is no definition of "legal representative"
Johnston v. Miami Valley Hosp. 61 Ohio App. 3d 81, 572 N.E.2d 169 (1989).
Id. at pp. 84-85.
- OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Page's Supp. 1990).
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in the law, this could be construed to include attorneys, guardians ad
litem or other persons with legal authority to consent for the patient.67
The counselor and social worker-client privilege provides that only the
client may give express consent to waive the privilege. 8 It is unclear
whether this is intended to mean that a guardian, attorney, or other legal
representative is not empowered to consent for the client, or if this is
merely the result of inconsistent legislative drafting. There does not ap-
pear to be any policy reason to give more protection to a person who seeks
the assistance of a social worker than to a person who seeks the assistance
of a psychiatrist or psychologist.
b. Waiver for Deceased. The right to protect communications made to
health care professionals does not terminate upon the patient's death,
but the executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased patient has
the authority to waive all statutory privileges for the deceased. 69 However,
an administrator or executor who requests the mental health records of
a deceased person who was hospitalized must show that the records are
necessary in order to administer the estate properly. 70
c. Filing Certain Claims. The physician, podiatrist, dentist, and psy-
chologist-patient privileges are waived when any person (or such person's
estate or legal representative) files any civil action including a malprac-
tice action, wrongful death, or workers compensation claim. The waiver,
however, is only effective for communications related "causally or his-
torically to physical or mental injuries relevant to issues in the claim
filed."71
Waiver of the counselor and social worker-client privilege occurs when
a client voluntarily testifies on a matter which is the subject of the coun-
seling.7
2
67 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 (Page's Supp. 1990). (If patient is
incompetent and has executed a durable power of attorney for health care.).
6 While the law states that a legal representative may waive the privilege for
a patient, it is not always clear who has the legal authority to consent for a
patient. This becomes a particular problem in the case of divorced parents of a
minor or with elderly incompetent individuals for whom there is no court ap-
pointed guardian or power of attorney. See In re Guardianship of Escola, 41 Ohio
App. 3d 42, 534 N.E.2d 866 (Stark 1987) which provides that the guardian of an
incompetent patient is capable of waiving the physician-patient privilege. If there
is doubt as to who may properly consent, the health care provider may wish to
get a determination from the court.
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02(B)(1)(b), 2317.02(G)(3) (Page's Supp. 1990).
70 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31(1) (Page's Supp. 1990).
7' Prior to the Tort Reform Act, effective January 5, 1988, an individual au-
tomatically waived the physician-patient privilege only when filing a malpractice
action or when voluntarily testifying in a matter regarding his medical condition.
Otto v. Miami Valley Hosp. Soc'y, 26 Ohio Misc. 72, 266 N.E.2d 270 (1971). A
plaintiff in a personal injury action did not waive the physician-patient privilege
by commencement of an action. Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 458
N.E.2d 465 (1983); State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton, 21 Ohio St.2d 21, 254 N.E.2d
681 (1970). The extension of the waiver of the physician-patient privilege for
filing any civil action is a far-reaching change in the Tort Reform Act.
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G)(4) (Page's Supp. 1990).
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d. Public Policy Exceptions to Privileged Communications. For some
time in Ohio, many courts had adopted a public policy exception to the
physician-patient privilege when the operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol was concerned.7 3 These cases generally
arose when a patient was taken to a hospital following an automobile
accident and a blood alcohol test was administered. If litigation arose,
opposing counsel would attempt to get the results of the blood alcohol
test at the hospital to prove that the patient was negligent while driving.
Courts have held that the public policy considerations in the prosecution
of persons who have driven while under the influence outweighed the
policy considerations underlying the physician-patient privilege. Adopt-
ing the rationale from these drunk driving cases, at least one court ig-
nored the statutory privilege and allowed privileged information to be
released to a grand jury, holding that the public interest in releasing the
information outweighed the interest in protecting the communication. 74
Nevertheless, in 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Smorgala
overruled these earlier cases and stated that blood alcohol tests obtained
as part of the patient's treatment at a hospital were privileged, and the
courts were not free to fashion a public policy exception to the law of
privileges in criminal or other actions.7 5
D. Federal Law Regarding Privileged Communications Made to
Health Care Providers
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that for federal civil
cases based upon state claims (generally diversity cases) the determi-
nation of whether a certain communication to a witness is privileged is
based on the state law that is being applied to that specific case. With
all other federal cases where federal law is applied, the privileges are
based upon common law doctrine as interpreted by the federal courts. As
previously noted, there is no recognition of privileged communication
between health care professionals and patients at common law.7 While
Rule 501 does not preclude the federal courts from adopting a federal
common law privilege for communications made to health care providers,
the federal courts have been reluctant to implement one.77
73 State v. Dress, 10 Ohio App. 3d 258, 461 N.E.2d 1312 (1982); State v. Tu, 17
Ohio App. 3d 159, 148 N.E.2d 830 (1984).
741n re Grand Jury Investigation of Brink, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d 5, 536 N.E.2d
1262 (1988).
15 50 Ohio St. 3d 222 (1990).
76 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher,
531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 965 (1976). See also United
States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1966); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380
(J. McNaughton rev. 1961); C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 101 at 211 (2d ed. 1972).
7 The court in General Motors Corp. v. Director of Nat'l Inst. for Occupational
Safety and Health Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980)
stated that "a decision in this case based upon considerations of the physician-
patient relationship would, in effect, expand the scope of the federal common law,"
and the court declined to do so.
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While not recognizing a general physician-patient privilege, the Sixth
Circuit has adopted a limited common law psychotherapist/patient priv-
ilege which applies to health care professionals engaging in psychoth-
erapy.78 This privilege, however, only extends to information regarding
treatment and does not extend to the identity of patients, the dates
treated, or the length of treatment on each date. 79 Therefore, except for
limited information covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
there is no protection of the patient's medical records in proceedings in
federal court where federal law is applied.
E. Discoverability and Admissibility of Patients' Hospital
Records Which Are Not Privileged
The patient medical record maintained by health care facilities contains
information placed in the record by a variety of sources. Central to the
record is information placed there by a physician, dentist or podiatrist.
But information is also placed in the record by nurses and a myriad of
other health care workers. Ohio has no law which provides that all records
maintained by health care facilities are privileged. Therefore, for patient
medical records maintained by health care facilities not to be subject to
disclosure, the records must be covered by one of the Health Care Profes-
sional-Privileges or be protected from discovery or admissibility because
they are alcohol and drug abuse treatment records, mental health records
or patient records regarding HIV, AIDS, or ARC. Even in these cases, as
discussed earlier, the protection is not absolute, but varies greatly de-
pending upon whether the information is sought pursuant to state or
federal judicial process, and in the case of Health Care Professional-
Privileges, whether the communications were made in a confidential set-
ting and whether the privilege was waived in any manner.
Therefore, depending upon the types of information in a patient's re-
cord, a large portion of a patient's medical record maintained by a health
care facility may be left unprotected. Records made by health care workers
to whom communications are not statutorily protected, such as nurses,
laboratory technicians, physical therapists and others, which are not re-
lated to alcohol, drug abuse, mental health and AIDS treatment may be
discoverable and admissible if they are relevant to the lawsuit.80 These
records would not be considered different from other types of records
maintained by the health care facility.
A few courts have attempted to give broader protection to records main-
tained by health care facilities by creatively extending the Health Care
Professional-Patient privilege. In Pollitt v. Mobay Chemical Corporation,8'
78 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 632.79 Id.
80 See Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947); Eikenberry v.
McFall, 36 N.E.2d 27 (Preble Cty. 1941); Heinemann v. Mitchell, 8 Ohio Misc.
390, 220 N.E.2d 616 (Hamilton Cty. 1964). Such records are admitted pursuant
to the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
81 95 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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the court held that hospital records which contain communications re-
garding diagnosis and treatment "in whole or in part" are not subject to
disclosure. In a recent unreported decision, Johnston v. Miami Valley, 82
the court broadly interpreted "communication" stating that "notations
made by a nurse in the nurse's portion of a hospital record" constituted
a privileged communication because such information is important for
the physician to know in order to properly diagnose and treat the patient.
The court emphatically stated that:
[since nurses often spend more time than physicians with hos-
pital patients, their notes often comprise the bulk of the hos-
pital records. It is our reading of the present statute that such
notes are privileged under the statute as they are included
within the statutory definition of communication. 3
This court tried to distinguish this case from the holding in Weis v. Weis,8
not by claiming that nurses are protected under the Health Care Profes-
sional-Privileges, but by redefining information created by nurses as a
part of the physician-patient communication. While the Johnston court's
subtle distinction was creative, it is doubtful whether a higher court would
recognize such a distinction.
Most Ohio cases have made a restrictive reading of the law and have
permitted notes or testimony by nurses or others, not specifically men-
tioned in the statutory Health Care Professional Privilege, to be admitted
as part of the judicial process. In Heinemann v. Mitchell, the court stated:
[W]hile it is well settled that Hospital records made in the
regular course of business and pertaining to the business of
hospitalization and recording observable acts, transactions, oc-
currences, or events incident to the treatment of a patient are
admissible as evidence, it is equally well settled that where
such records contain communications between physician and
patient which have been reduced to writing and incorporated
in the records, such portions of the records are privileged by
virtue of the express provisions of Revised Code, Sec.
2317.02(A) and may not be introduced in evidence over the
objection of the patient. 85
This limited application of the law of privileges to medical records main-
tained by health care facilities was developed for a much different medical
system than the one we have today, and it simply has not kept pace with
today's modern system.
Hospitals began to appear in the United States in the 17th century.86
However, well into the 19th century, most persons were treated in their
82 No. 11181 (1989 Ohio App. Lexis 580).
83Id. at 7-8.
8 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
5 8 Ohio Misc. 390, 220 N.E.2d 616 (Hamilton Cty. 1964).
E. HAYT, L. HAYT & A. GROESCHEL, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PA-
TIENT 84 (1972).
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home by a physician rather than in a hospital. 87 Hospitals were considered
predominantly welfare institutions to treat the indigent. Health care was
predominantly a series of one-on-one visits between the physician and
patient. Today, the myriad of health care workers such as laboratory
technicians, physical therapists, counselors and other providers were vir-
tually non-existent and patient treatment was administered solely by
physicians.
The first physician-patient privilege statute was enacted in 1828 in the
State of New York;88 Ohio statutory law first recognized the physician-
patient privilege in 1880.89 Therefore, the Ohio statutory physician-pa-
tient privilege was established when most persons sought treatment
solely from a physician in their home rather than in a hospital. Thus, at
the time the physician-patient privilege was adopted, there was no need
for a patient-nurse or patient-lab technician privilege or privileges ex-
tending to other health care professionals. Given the nature of hospitals
at that time, there was, in all probability, little concern about extending
the privilege from the physician-patient context to cover hospital records
as well. While the Ohio legislature has through the years granted a few
other professionals the privilege, the legislature has not granted the priv-
ilege to the full range of professionals who may render care to the patient
today.
In modern times most patients spend more time with nurses and other
health care providers than with physicians. It is questionable then why
as health care has changed, the legislature has not chosen to extend the
range of health care professionals to whom the privilege applies. The
major public policy reasons cited for the need for the existence of the
Health Care Professional-Privileges - namely, the encouragement of
honest communications between patient and health care workers to aid
effective treatment of disease, maintenance of the patient's privacy in-
terests, and maintenance of the ethics of the medical professional - are
not limited to the physician-patient relationship but apply to the nurse-
patient relationship and the relationship between patients and other
health care professionals as well.90 The limitations imposed upon the
Health Care Professional Privileges serve to undercut the public policy
the privilege was intended to protect. Certainly, open communication
between patients and health care workers is not promoted if a patient
understands that information told to professionals not covered by the
privilege or to professionals covered by the privilege but treating the
patient cooperatively with an uncovered professional is not granted pro-
tection. It is the sorry state of the law that the public policy of encouraging
open communication will only be accomplished if the patient wrongly
believes that the law protects all communications made in the health
care context.
87 J. DUFFY, THE HEALERS 57-62 (1979).
88 D. Shuman, The Origin of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional
Secret, S.W.L.J. Vol. 39, 1985, p. 661.
89 Supra note 34.
See generally DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and
Patient, 10 W.REs. L.REv. 488 (1959).
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Limiting the law of privileged communications to certain health care
professionals also does little to meet the public policy goal of protecting
a patient's privacy goals, nor does it protect the ethics of the health care
professionals who are not covered by the privilege.
IV. THE DILEMMA OF HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
A health care facility confronts a serious dilemma when it receives a
subpoena for a specific patient's medical records and must decide whether
(i) to refuse the disclosure of any portion of the records, or (ii) to release
the records in whole or in part.
Many health care facilities have internal written policies which are
disseminated to their employees and independent contractors (i.e. phy-
sicians) in order to protect patient confidentiality to the fullest extent.
In general, most facilities usually respond to each subpoena for a patient's
medical records by filing with the court a motion to quash or other refusal
to release the requested records. This approach creates a significant ex-
pense for the facility to fight each request for records. 91
Other facilities undoubtedly believe that there must be compliance with
each subpoena and that the facility must release all requested information
without question. This approach, while significantly less expensive, sub-
jects the facility to possible civil liability for improper release of records.
In Pacheco v. Ortiz,92 a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas court stated that
"the law is quite clear that any hospital records of a party, albeit the
plaintiff in this matter, may not be released to anyone if such matters
are privileged unless such privilege is waived by the party being treated."
The court proceeded to state that hospital records which contain some
privileged information should not be released pursuant to a validly issued
subpoena until there are safeguards that privileged information not be
released.
Unless there is valid consent given by the patient, there are several
decisions to be made by a health care facility in determining which por-
tions of medical records may be released. The facility must first determine
whether records involve alcoholism, drug abuse, mental health or AIDS
records. Then the facility must decide whether the case is in federal or
state court and if it is in federal court, whether state or federal law
supplies the rules of privilege to be applied. If the matter is in state court
or if state law governs in federal court, the provider must also decide,
among other things, whether the communication was made to a health
care provider covered by the privilege and whether third parties were
present. Even if a privilege exists, it must be determined whether the
privilege has been waived.
91 See State ex rel. Whitney v. McLain, 49 Ohio St. 2d 155, 359 N.E.2d 442
(1977); OHIo R. CalM. P. 17(B).92 11 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 2, 463 N.E.2d 670, 671 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1983).
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It is extremely unreasonable to expect a health care facility to make
these determinations. Usually, the subpoena only gives the caption of the
case and the court involved. If the case is in federal court, the health care
facility has no ability to determine whether state claims or federal claims
are involved. Similarly, determining from the caption of the case whether
a waiver has occurred is impossible. While Ohio law provides that a person
waives a Health Care Professional-Privilege by filing a claim if the in-
formation is historically or causally related, the law does not provide that
the mere fact of filing any lawsuit waives the privilege. While the health
care facility may be aware that the patient for whom the records are
sought is the plaintiff in the lawsuit, a determination must still be made
as to whether the information sought is causally or historically related
to the claim.
Despite the difficulty a health care provider has in making these de-
terminations, one Ohio court has recently stated that the physician from
whom the records are sought should be making determinations as to
whether the privileges apply and, if the patient is the plaintiff, that the
physician should determine if the records are causally and historically
related to the case. 93 We submit that this is unwise, however, because (as
just noted) the physician usually does not have sufficient information
upon which to make such an evaluation. Even if the facility goes to the
effort of obtaining the relevant information, the facility, simply as the
holder of the records, should not be forced to place itself in jeopardy by
making such a determination. Facilities which review records and de-
termine which portions of the records may be released pursuant to law
and excise protected portions of the records are placing themselves in the
position of being an arbiter of the case because the facility is determining
the scope of the existing statutory privileges. Thus, to answer a subpoena
in any manner other than a refusal to release records subjects a facility
to significant legal expense to evaluate the case and subjects the facility
to civil liability for improper release of records if their evaluation was
incorrect.
The safest course for a health care facility is to answer each and every
request for medical records with a refusal to release the records unless
the facility has received an applicable signed release from the patient or
a court order. Since a facility cannot ignore a validly issued subpoena,
the receipt of the subpoena places the facility in the position of being
required to respond to the subpoena in some manner. If the facility cannot
receive agreement from the party who subpoenaed the records to with-
draw the subpoena, the facility has two options: (1) it can file a motion
to quash the subpoena or (2) the custodian of records can appear as re-
quested in the subpoena and assert the relevant Health Care Professional
Patient privilege. This then places the burden upon the party requesting
the records to petition the court for an order directing release of the
93 Baker v. Quick Stop Oil Change, Case No. CV89-10-0671 (C.P. Allen Cty.,
Ohio 1990).
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records. The goal of the health care facility is either to obtain a properly
issued court order specifying which records, if any, are to be released, 94
or to have the motion quashed and no records released.
V. LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER ACTIONS
If health care facilities begin to answer each and every subpoena for
medical records with a refusal to release the records, and each matter is
taken to a judge to rule on the motion to compel the production of doc-
uments, the litigation process may be considerably slowed, and the courts
may become further clogged by hearing a number of motions regarding
records.
This action, however, will take the burden for determining questions
of medical records release from health care facilities where it does not
appropriately belong and place it on the courts and litigants. To ease the
burden of the courts determining countless medical records questions,
there are a number of possible solutions.
A. Judicial Action
The courts could reevaluate the statutory privileges under Ohio law.
The Weis95 case, which set forth the principle that communications to and
by nurses and other health care professionals not named in the statute
are not protected by the privilege, was decided in 1947. Forty-four years
ago the health care system was very different from today. The courts
could take notice of this and hold that the privileges are extended to a
wide range of health care professionals. Thus, a nurse assisting a phy-
sician with a procedure would be deemed to keep the information confi-
dential, just as the physician does.
While a judicial change would protect more information and clear up
some ambiguities in the law, such a change would still not address the
issues of who should determine whether the privilege has been waived
when the patient fights a lawsuit, or who should determine if the infor-
mation is admissible in federal court.
B. Legislative Action
The best resolution to the current problem with privileged information
would be for the Ohio General Assembly to revisit its position regarding
privileged communications. The General Assembly should first examine
whether the public policy reasons for the Health Care Professional Priv-
9 Courts have held that even if information is privileged, the court may compel
pretrial discovery for full preparation in case the privilege is waived at trial. See
Huzjak v. United States, 118 F.R.D. 61 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Floyd v. Copas, 9 Ohio
Op.3d 298 (Montgomery Cty. 1977).
95 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 42 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
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ileges still exist. If not, all the Health Care Professional Privileges should
simply be abolished. If, however, the General Assembly determines that
the policy reasons for the physician-patient privilege are as vital today
as when the privilege was originally adopted, the legislature should adopt
one of the following or similar positions:
(1) recognize a general health care worker-patient privilege under
which a covered health care worker would be defined broadly to include
nurses, nursing assistants, laboratory technicians, receptionists, and any
other persons who are present for communications with the patient or
have access to the patient's medical records;
(2) recognize an all-encompassing health care facility-patient privilege
whereby health care facility is defined broadly to incorporate hospitals,
nursing homes, ambulatory surgery centers, all types of outpatient fa-
cilities, including urgent care centers and diagnostic laboratories, and
any other type of health care facility; or
(3) extend the existing privilege in Ohio to make confidential all matters
relating to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient within the health
care facility.
Any of these changes would protect a great deal of patient medical
information maintained by health care facilities and provide such facil-
ities with clear guidance as to how to respond to subpoenas for medical
records.
Another required legislative change in this area would be for Congress
to address the issue of privileges or the lack thereof, so that there is
national guidance on what types of communications are privileged and
which are not privileged in federal actions. While both these legislative
changes and the above-described judicial solutions would clear up am-
biguities as to the scope of the privilege, questions would still remain.
If the legislature does not institute one of these proposals, it should at
least grant health care facilities immunity for responding to a subpoena
for medical records so long as the facility in good faith releases the records
believing that it is acting in accordance with state law. This would elim-
inate the dilemma which health care facilities face when in receipt of a
subpoena. Due to the ambiguities enumerated in this article, there are
no clear-cut answers as to which parts, if any, of a patient's medical record
must be released, and a health care facility which attempts to make a
good faith determination places itself at risk of liability. If health care
facilities are granted immunity, the facilities would be able to act in good
faith and not be held civilly liable for breach of confidentiality due to the
ambiguities in the law.
C. Prosecutors Obtain Consent
An action which would aid health care facilities greatly when receiving
subpoenas in criminal actions is for prosecutors regularly to obtain the
victim's consent for release of medical records when the prosecutor an-
ticipates needing the victim's medical records. Prosecutors could work
with the police to create a system under which consent is routinely ob-
tained from victims for the release of the victim's records.
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D. Defense Motions Under Criminal Rule 16(d)
Ohio Criminal Rule 16(d)9 6 requires prosecutors to release all medical
records in the prosecutor's possession to defense counsel upon request.
Prior to attempting to obtain records through a health care facility, de-
fendants should be required instead to file a motion under Ohio Criminal
Rule 16(d) to compel the prosecutor to turn over all records already ob-
tained by the prosecutor. Defense counsel may be forced, in practice, to
use this alternative if health care facilities begin to deny records.
E. Pretrial Discovery Motions Regarding Medical Records
Prior to subpoenaing the medical records from a health care facility,
counsel may wish, as a routine part of litigation, to file a pretrial discovery
motion for the release of medical records. A subpoena to a health care
facility may therefore be accompanied by a court order signed by the
judge which specifically states which records regarding a patient are to
be released from the facility. This would permit the health care facility
to review the records, excise the documents that are not to be released,
and release the records without fear of breach of confidentiality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law regarding release of medical records by health care facilities
is currently ambiguous, confusing, and greatly at odds with the typical
patient's expectations of confidentiality. The law of medical privileges
was enacted at a time when medical care had little resemblance to our
current health care system. Instead of fulfilling the public policies of
encouraging open communications between patients and their health care
providers, maintaining patient privacy and protecting the ethics of the
health care profession, the law has given an inconsistent patchwork of
protection which is not capable of logical interpretation.
Hospitals and other health care facilities, which are uninvolved by-
standers to judicial action in which records are being sought are none-
theless subjected to great expense and potential for liability. If health
care facilities remove themselves from the dispute and demand court
orders prior to the release of records, litigants will be forced to turn to
the courts for relief. When this happens, perhaps long overdue legislative
reform will also occur.
-OHio R. CRIM. P. 16(d).
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